Skip to main content
Back
ExposureAWS
2 min read

Wyze customer information exposed through a reporting database

Owner
Wyze customers
When
Dec 4–26, 2019Disclosed Dec 26, 2019
Entry
A change removed protections from an AWS-hosted database that held a copy of customer data.

Customer information copied into a Wyze reporting database became publicly reachable after a configuration change. Wyze restricted access by network address and refreshed user tokens. A follow-up audit found a second unprotected nonproduction database.

What was exposed

Outside Wyze
Researcher
Internet
Wyze reporting
Reporting database

Wyze reporting

  1. 1

    A change removes protection from the reporting copy

    December 4

    Wyze says an employee removed security protections from a customer-data copy used for reporting. The company identified AWS as its host.

  2. 2

    A reporting copy becomes publicly reachable

    December 4–26

    The finder reported that customer information could be read over the internet. Wyze confirmed that security protections on a reporting database holding a copy of customer data had been removed on December 4.

  3. 3

    Wyze restricts access and refreshes tokens

    December 26

    After notification on December 26, Wyze changed permission rules and added an IP allowlist that restricted which addresses could connect to its databases. It also refreshed user tokens.

Impact

Wyze confirmed that the exposed information included customer email addresses, device names and certain integration tokens. It refreshed user tokens as a precaution.

Could this have been prevented?

Apply access controls to reporting copies of customer data

Wyze identified an IP allowlist as part of its response. For reporting databases, keep the intended client networks and account permissions documented and review other copies when one is exposed. The disclosed architecture is too limited to identify the particular AWS control that would have blocked this access.

Incident control assessments

0
Prevented
0
Contained
3
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

Outside Wyze
Researcher
Internet
Wyze reporting
Reporting database

Wyze reporting

1 · A change removes protection from the reporting copy

1 Not covered

2 · A reporting copy becomes publicly reachable

1 Not covered

3 · Wyze restricts access and refreshes tokens

1 Not covered

Key facts

  • Wyze said the reporting system was hosted on AWS in the United States.
  • Wyze dated the configuration mistake to December 4.
  • On December 26, Wyze restricted database access by IP address.
  • Wyze’s audit identified another nonproduction database and it was secured on December 29.

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    [Updated 02-13-20] Data leak 12-26-2019Wyze · Dec 26, 2019 · Vendor reportOwner’s account of the AWS-hosted reporting data, December 4 configuration change, IP allowlisting, token refresh and separate nonproduction database.
  2. 2.
    Wyze Essay 1 - Beijing Dragon Network Co Ltd.Twelve Security · Dec 26, 2019 · ResearchFinder described publicly accessible databases and the data visible. Wyze disputed elements of the finder’s account.

The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of the exposure; the owner's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the data is exposed. They are not an assessment of the owner's security program.

More cloud attack breakdowns

All breakdowns