What happened
Replaying the Salesloft Drift March 2025 intrusion
- 1
The Salesloft GitHub account
Mar–Jun 2025The actor holds access to the Salesloft GitHub account, downloads content from multiple repositories, adds a guest user and workflows, and reconnaissance runs in the Salesloft and Drift environments; how the account was accessed is not stated.
- 2
Drift's AWS environment
Not dated, before Aug 8, 2025The actor accesses Drift's AWS environment and obtains the OAuth tokens Drift holds for its customers' integrations; how it got there, and what in the environment held the tokens, is not stated.
- 3
Customers' Salesforce and Workspace tenants
Aug 8–18, 2025The stolen tokens are accepted by customers' Salesforce instances from Tor exit nodes and hosting addresses; objects are counted, the Case object is exported in bulk and the export jobs are deleted, and Drift Email tokens read a very small number of Google Workspace mailboxes. Logs are not affected.
- 4
Secrets in the stolen data
Aug 2025; Aug 9 at CloudflareThe exported data is searched for AWS access keys, passwords and Snowflake-related tokens; Cloudflare finds 104 of its API tokens in its stolen Case data, and no source reports a harvested key being used.
OAuth tokens taken from Drift's AWS environment were used from as early as August 8 to at least August 18, 2025 to export data such as Case, Account, Contact, User and Opportunity records from numerous Salesforce instances, and the data was searched for AWS access keys, passwords and Snowflake-related tokens. Drift Email tokens read email from a very small number of Google Workspace accounts on August 9, 2025. Google estimated that more than 700 organizations were potentially impacted; Salesloft confirmed no number.
Where cloud-provider controls fit
The tokens that opened the Salesforce instances were taken from Drift's AWS environment, and a Salesforce instance accepted them from any network unless the tenant restricted it: Okta's instance refused the stolen token because the connection came from an unauthorized IP address. On your clouds you can bind a vendor's credential to the vendor's declared address ranges, with VPC Service Controls on Google Cloud and a network source on Oracle Cloud. A network perimeter and account segmentation around a token store cap what a stolen cloud credential reads, but no cloud setting refuses a read by the application that holds the tokens. Refuse long-lived keys, so no new key sits in data a vendor can read; keys that already exist stay. Salesloft and Salesforce revoked every Drift Salesforce token on August 20, 2025; Google revoked the Drift Email tokens on August 28, 2025; how the actor reached the GitHub account, and how it got from there to Drift's AWS environment, is not stated.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, not as a whole. 2 controls would have refused a step outright, and 6 controls would have limited one. 10 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 2
- Prevented
- 6
- Contained
- 10
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the Salesloft Drift March 2025 intrusion
1 · The Salesloft GitHub account
2 Contained4 Not covered2 · Drift's AWS environment
2 Contained1 Not covered4 on other clouds3 · Customers' Salesforce and Workspace tenants
2 Prevented4 Not covered14 on other clouds4 · Secrets in the stolen data
2 Contained1 Not covered3 on other cloudsKey facts
- From March to June 2025 the actor had access to the Salesloft GitHub account, downloaded content from multiple repositories, added a guest user and established workflows, per Mandiant's findings as Salesloft posted them on September 6 (The Register) or September 7, 2025 (Salesforce Ben); how the account was accessed was not stated
- The actor then accessed Drift's AWS environment and obtained OAuth tokens for Drift customers' integrations; no source dated this step or said how the environment was reached
- The tokens were used against Salesforce instances from as early as August 8 to at least August 18, 2025, per Google Threat Intelligence Group; at Cloudflare a Bulk API 2.0 job exported the Case object from 11:11:56 to 11:15:18 UTC on August 17 and was deleted at 11:15:42
- Okta's Salesforce instance refused the stolen Drift token because the connection came from an unauthorized IP address, per Okta
- Cloudflare found 104 of its API tokens in its stolen Case data and rotated them all; Google Threat Intelligence Group assessed that the actor sought AWS access keys, passwords and Snowflake-related tokens
- Salesloft and Salesforce revoked every Drift Salesforce access and refresh token on August 20, 2025; Salesloft's first notice is dated August 20 by the Atlanta Journal-Constitution and August 21 by BleepingComputer. Google estimated that more than 700 organizations were potentially impacted
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.Widespread Data Theft Targets Salesforce Instances via Salesloft DriftGoogle Threat Intelligence Group (Mandiant) · Aug 28, 2025 · ResearchCampaign window, actor, data exported, credentials sought, indicators, token revocation, Google Workspace access, hardening recommendations
- 2.FLASH-20250912-001: Cyber Criminal Groups UNC6040 and UNC6395 Compromising Salesforce Instances for Data Theft and ExtortionFBI (Internet Crime Complaint Center) · Sep 12, 2025 · AdvisoryOfficial confirmation, token revocation, indicators, mitigations
- 3.The impact of the Salesloft Drift breach on Cloudflare and our customersCloudflare · Sep 2, 2025 · Vendor reportTenant-side timeline, data exposed, indicators, secrets in stolen data, notification dates, response actions
- 4.Salesloft Drift Supply Chain Incident: Key Details and Zscaler's ResponseZscaler · Sep 7, 2025 · Vendor reportData exposed, scope limits, response actions
- 5.The Salesloft incident: A wake-up call for SaaS security and IPSIE adoptionOkta · Sep 2, 2025 · Vendor reportControl that stopped the token, recommended controls
- 6.Threat Brief: Salesloft Drift Integration Used To Compromise Salesforce InstancesPalo Alto Networks Unit 42 · Sep 2, 2025 · ResearchObjects targeted, tooling pattern, anti-forensics, hunting guidance
- 7.Salesloft: GitHub Account Breach Was Ground Zero in Drift CampaignInfosecurity Magazine · Sep 9, 2025 · NewsGitHub access, Drift AWS environment, token theft, containment statement
- 8.Salesloft Drift data breach: Investigation reveals how attackers got inHelp Net Security · Sep 8, 2025 · NewsGitHub access, reconnaissance scope, containment statement, disclosure date
- 9.Salesloft: March GitHub repo breach led to Salesforce data theft attacksBleepingComputer · Sep 8, 2025 · NewsDisclosure dates, GitHub access, named victims, attribution claims
- 10.Salesloft's Drift breach traced to a GitHub account compromiseThe Register · Sep 8, 2025 · NewsUpdate dates, containment actions, named victims, actor aliases
- 11.Salesloft Drift compromised en masse, impacting all third-party integrationsCyberScoop · Aug 28, 2025 · NewsOrganization count estimate, scope beyond Salesforce, Salesforce disconnect date
- 12.Salesforce Re-Enables Salesloft Integrations (Except Drift) Following HacksSalesforce Ben · Sep 8, 2025 · NewsSalesforce actions and dates, Drift status, Salesloft notice dates
- 13.At least 700 organizations potentially impacted by hack of Atlanta tech firmThe Atlanta Journal-Constitution · Sep 5, 2025 · NewsDrift shutdown time, first notice date, victim count statements, open questions
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.