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IntrusionAWS
2 min read

An altered Safe wallet interface misled three Bybit signers

Victim
Safe and Bybit
When
Feb 4, 2025Disclosed Feb 21, 2025
Entry
Unauthorized use of a Safe developer’s AWS credentials.

Three signers at the cryptocurrency exchange Bybit approved what looked like a routine wallet transfer. Each had received altered files from Safe’s wallet website. The transaction instead gave the intruder control of a Bybit wallet, leading to the theft of about $1.5 billion in digital assets.

What happened

Outside the organization
Outside party
Internet
Safe’s AWS account
Bybit
Website hosting
Wallet signers

Incident overview

  1. 1

    A developer’s AWS credentials were used

    From February 5, 2025

    Mandiant found unauthorized use of a Safe developer’s AWS credentials. Sygnia reported access from external networks and said the preliminary cloud investigation had not verified the website change.

  2. 2

    Altered files reached three signers

    February 21, 2025

    Sygnia found the altered website files in the browsers of all three Bybit signers and traced delivery to Safe’s S3-backed website.

  3. 3

    A wallet transaction was approved

    February 21, 2025

    Bybit’s three signers approved a transaction through the altered interface. It gave the intruder control of a wallet containing about $1.5 billion in digital assets.

Impact

Three Bybit signers approved a transaction through an altered wallet interface. About $1.5 billion in digital assets was stolen.

Could this have been prevented?

Verify wallet transactions independently of the website

Restrict the networks from which developer credentials can be used, and protect the software release process. Bybit’s three signers relied on the same altered interface. An independent way to verify exactly what a transaction authorizes addresses the separate risk at approval.

Incident control assessments

0
Prevented
1
Contained
2
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

Outside the organization
Outside party
Internet
Safe’s AWS account
Bybit
Website hosting
Wallet signers

Incident overview

1 · A developer’s AWS credentials were used

1 Contained

2 · Altered files reached three signers

1 Not covered

3 · A wallet transaction was approved

1 Not covered

Key facts

  • Mandiant dated the compromise of a Safe developer’s computer to February 4 and the first unauthorized use of that developer’s AWS credentials to February 5.
  • On February 21, all three signers’ browsers had cached the altered website files.
  • Sygnia traced those files to Safe’s Amazon S3-backed website.
  • Bybit said its investigators found no indication that its own infrastructure had been compromised.

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    Sygnia investigation: Bybit hackSygnia · Mar 16, 2025 · Vendor reportSygnia examined the three signers’ browser artifacts, S3-backed origin and wallet transaction. Its account reports external network use and explains the limits of the preliminary AWS evidence.
  2. 2.
    Preliminary findings into the Safe{Wallet} incidentMandiant · undated · Vendor reportThe preliminary update reproduced by Sygnia dates the use of a developer’s AWS session credentials to February 5.
  3. 3.
    Preliminary incident timelineMandiant · undated · Vendor reportThe timeline records relevant timestamps. Sygnia’s accompanying text explains the limits of Mandiant’s preliminary findings about the website change.
  4. 4.
    Bybit Confirms Security Integrity Amid Safe{Wallet} IncidentBybit · Feb 26, 2025 · Vendor reportBybit reported that Safe developer credentials were compromised and that no compromise of Bybit’s infrastructure had been found.
  5. 5.
    Data perimeters on AWSAWS · undated · AdvisoryNetwork perimeter service control policies can constrain requests made by covered identities to expected networks.

The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.

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