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IntrusionAWS
11 min read

AWS breach at a SaaS company: a leaked admin key wipes production

Victim
An unnamed SaaS company
When
Not stated; public by April 2025Disclosed Apr 15, 2025
Entry
Leaked access keys of an IAM user that held AdministratorAccess, used from VPN addresses; how the keys leaked is not stated.

A growing SaaS company that the sources do not name lost its AWS production environment to an attacker who held the leaked access key of an IAM user with AdministratorAccess. From VPN addresses, the attacker listed the resources of every region, opened the database security groups, reset the RDS master passwords, copied S3 content, stopped and deleted CloudTrail, then turned deletion protection off and deleted the resources and the backups in the same account. Production was down for a week; how the key leaked and when the intrusion happened are not stated.

What happened

External Parties
VPN service addresses
Cloud security consultant
Internet
AWS APIleaked administrator key
+ staging resources
+ CI/CD system
+ production user keys
Staging and Non-production
Production Account
RDS Databases
S3 Buckets
CloudTrail Trail and Logs
EC2 Instances
Production Backups

Replaying the AWS intrusion at a SaaS company

  1. 1

    An administrator key from the internet

    Dates not stated

    A leaked access key of an IAM user with AdministratorAccess is used from VPN addresses, scripts list the resources of every region, and the attacker reaches both the staging and the production accounts. How the key leaked and the path between the accounts are not stated.

  2. 2

    Databases opened

    Dates not stated

    The attacker changes the security groups of the publicly addressed RDS databases to allow its VPN addresses, and resets their master passwords.

  3. 3

    Data out

    Dates not stated

    The attacker copies S3 bucket content out. Which buckets, what data and how much are not stated.

  4. 4

    Logs, resources and backups destroyed

    Dates not stated

    The attacker stops and deletes the trail and erases logs from its bucket, turns deletion protection off on EC2 and RDS resources, then deletes the resources and the backups in the same account.

Impact

Databases were compromised, S3 data was copied out, the trail and its logs were deleted, and production resources and their backups were deleted; production was down for a week and more than 1,000 developer hours were lost.

Outcome

Where cloud-provider controls fit

Every call in this intrusion was signed with one long-term IAM user key that held AdministratorAccess, and every production resource, its backups and its trail sat in the organization's management account. A service control policy that refuses IAM user calls without MFA binds only member accounts: it does not bind the management account, and the source does not say which account held the user, so the first control is to keep your workloads out of it. A permissions boundary with a network condition and a bucket policy that admits only your networks also bind the management account, and they refuse calls from addresses outside them. S3 Object Lock keeps the logs written before the trail stops, and AWS Backup Vault Lock in compliance mode keeps the recovery points of a locked vault from deletion by any principal; the source does not say what kind of backups were deleted. Deletion protection on the resources was on, and the key's own rights turned it off.

Could this have been prevented?

In hindsight, not as a whole. 2 controls would have refused a step outright, and 11 controls would have limited one. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.

2
Prevented
11
Contained
0
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

External Parties
VPN service addresses
Cloud security consultant
Internet
AWS APIleaked administrator key
+ staging resources
+ CI/CD system
+ production user keys
Staging and Non-production
Production Account
RDS Databases
S3 Buckets
CloudTrail Trail and Logs
EC2 Instances
Production Backups

Replaying the AWS intrusion at a SaaS company

1 · An administrator key from the internet

1 Prevented3 Contained9 on other clouds

2 · Databases opened

3 Contained6 on other clouds

3 · Data out

1 Prevented1 Contained3 on other clouds

4 · Logs, resources and backups destroyed

4 Contained9 on other clouds

Key facts

  • The entry was the leaked access key of an IAM user that held the AWS managed AdministratorAccess policy; how it leaked and which account held the user were not stated
  • Every production resource and its backups sat in one AWS account, which was also the AWS Organizations management account, and the RDS databases had public IPs on public subnets
  • The attacker stopped CloudTrail, deleted the trail and deleted logs from its bucket in the same account; GuardDuty raised only a low-severity alert about the stopped trail
  • Deletion protection on EC2 and RDS resources was on; the attacker turned it off with the key's own rights and deleted the resources and the backups
  • Production was disrupted for a week and more than 1,000 developer hours were lost, according to the consultant's case study
  • The case study, published by April 2025, gives no dates for the intrusion and does not name the company

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    Securing a SaaS Company's AWS Environment After a BreachChandrapal Badshah (independent cloud security consultant) · undated · ResearchEntry by a leaked administrator access key, VPN origin, enumeration across regions, security group ingress, RDS master password resets, S3 copy, CloudTrail stopped and trail deleted, deletion protection turned off, resources and backups deleted, staging and production reached, contributing factors, GuardDuty alert, impact, containment and rebuild, recommendations
  2. 2.
    AWS breach at a SaaS companyWiz Cloud Threat Landscape · Apr 15, 2025 · ResearchPublication date, summary of the entry vector and impact, threat actor unknown

The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.

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