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DemonstrationAWS
1 min read

AWS role discovery and the separate risk of open trust

Environment
AWS IAM role research
When
Published August 29, 2018. Test date unknown.Disclosed Aug 29, 2018
Entry
AWS responses revealed the existence of some cross-account role identifiers.

Rhino Security Labs found that a role’s existence could be inferred across AWS accounts. It also found accounts that trusted any AWS principal. One observation concerns discoverability. The other concerns authorization.

What the demonstration did

Researcher
Rhino Security Labs
Internet
AWS IAM
IAM role

Research environment / AWS IAM role research

  1. 1

    A role name could be distinguished across accounts

    2018 research

    Rhino found that AWS service responses could distinguish existing role identifiers in other accounts. That observation did not by itself grant access to the role.

  2. 2

    Some roles trusted any AWS principal

    2018 research

    Rhino reported upwards of 50 instances of accounts with globally open role trust. The rights of an issued session would depend on the individual role.

Impact

Rhino identified roles without having permission in their target accounts. Separately, the researchers reported finding upwards of 50 instances of overly broad trust. That figure does not count confirmed intrusions.

Would the controls have stopped it?

Authorize each external role caller

Where the intended callers are known, a role trust policy can refuse every other external principal. Role discovery alone establishes no right to a session.

Incident control assessments

1
Prevented
0
Contained
1
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

Researcher
Rhino Security Labs
Internet
AWS IAM
IAM role

Research environment / AWS IAM role research

1 · A role name could be distinguished across accounts

1 Not covered

2 · Some roles trusted any AWS principal

1 Prevented

Key facts

  • The research article was published on August 29, 2018.
  • The discovery behavior did not require the researcher to have permissions in the target account.
  • Rhino said it identified and reported upwards of 50 instances of accounts with global role trust.
  • An identifiable role can still refuse to issue a session to an external principal.

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    Assume the Worst: Enumerating AWS Roles through ‘AssumeRole’Rhino Security Labs · Aug 29, 2018 · ResearchThe researchers distinguish role discovery from globally open trust and report notifying affected organizations.
  2. 2.
    Update a role trust policyAmazon Web Services · undated · AdvisoryThe trust policy specifies who can assume the role. Cross-account authorization also involves the caller’s permissions.

The estate in the replay follows the researchers' description of their own test environment. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the run. They are not an assessment of any company's security program.

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