What happened
Replaying the Megalodon May 2026 intrusion
- 1
Write access to default branches
May 18, 2026, about 11:36–17:48 UTCAccounts push 5,718 commits straight to default branches, with forged CI-bot identities and no pull request; how they got write access is unconfirmed.
- 2
Credentials on the runner
Run dates not statedOn a run, the payload reads the runner's environment and credential files, asks the metadata services for instance role credentials and requests the job's OIDC token; no source names a runner where it ran in full.
- 3
Sent to the attacker
Run dates not statedThe payload posts one archive from the runner to a server addressed by IP; in one job shown, a runtime agent blocks the upload.
- 4
Into the npm registry
May 19–21, 2026The Tiledesk maintainer, whose npm account was not compromised, publishes releases 2.18.6 to 2.18.12 with the planted workflow file; installing them does not run the payload.
5,718 commits planted workflows in 5,561 public repositories in about six hours. Any run of the mass variant could collect the runner's environment, credential files, instance role credentials and OIDC token and post them out. One run is shown, with its upload blocked. The Tiledesk maintainer, unaware of it, shipped the planted workflow in the npm releases 2.18.6 to 2.18.12. No source reports use of a collected credential.
Where cloud-provider controls fit
The push and the planted workflow live in GitHub, so no cloud control reaches them: a ruleset on your default branch that requires an approved pull request and lists no bypass actors holds direct pushes back while it stands, though the sources do not say which permissions the pushing accounts held, and a workflow that runs on push still runs from another branch. Once the payload runs on a self-hosted runner in your cloud, cloud controls bound what it takes: a network condition in a service control policy, a service perimeter or disabled public network access keeps the instance role credentials usable only from the runner's network, a federation trust that names one repository and a protected environment refuses the copied OIDC token, and an outbound allow list refuses the upload from runners behind it; the sources do not say which runners ran the payload. A GitHub-hosted runner sits outside your cloud network, and a release to npm is outside every cloud, where a minimum release age in your npm settings only delays a poisoned version. No source reports use of a collected credential, and you still own the rotation of everything a runner could reach.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, no control would have stopped it. 12 controls would have limited how far it went. 3 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 0
- Prevented
- 12
- Contained
- 3
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the Megalodon May 2026 intrusion
1 · Write access to default branches
1 Contained1 Not covered2 · Credentials on the runner
7 Contained2 on other clouds3 · Sent to the attacker
3 Contained1 Not covered1 on other clouds4 · Into the npm registry
1 Contained1 Not coveredKey facts
- 5,718 malicious commits were pushed to 5,561 distinct repositories on May 18, 2026, between about 11:36 and 17:48 UTC, per SafeDep; StepSecurity gives 5,561 repositories within six hours, and OX Security found over 3,500 workflow files carrying the payload and called the larger total alleged
- The commit author and committer identities were set to look like CI or build bots, and the Tiledesk commit went to master with no pull request and no merge commit; whether branch protection was absent or bypassed is not stated
- Who pushed and with which credential is unconfirmed: SafeDep describes throwaway accounts and infers compromised personal access tokens or deploy keys, while Hudson Rock matched 331 of 978 pushing usernames to infostealer infections; neither shows which credential made a push
- The mass variant added a workflow that ran on a push to any branch and on pull request events, and the targeted variant replaced a Tiledesk Docker build workflow with one that ran only on manual dispatch; both could request the job's OIDC token, per SafeDep
- The payload dumped the runner's environment, read credential files, asked the AWS (with an IMDSv2 session token), Google Cloud and Azure metadata services for instance role credentials and requested the job's GitHub OIDC token; one job shown by StepSecurity had its upload blocked by a runtime agent
- The Tiledesk maintainer published versions 2.18.6 to 2.18.12 of the Tiledesk server package between May 19 and 21 with the modified workflow file inside; installing it does not run the payload, per SafeDep, GitHub's advisory of May 22 lists six of those versions, and no source reports use of a collected credential
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.Megalodon: Mass GitHub Repo Backdooring via CI WorkflowsSafeDep · May 21, 2026 · Researchtimeline, counts, push path, forged identities, workflow triggers and permissions, payload phases, exfiltration, Tiledesk npm releases, run evidence, recommendations
- 2.Megalodon: Mass GitHub Actions Secret Exfiltration Across 5,500+ Public RepositoriesStepSecurity · May 22, 2026 · Researchwindow, counts, push path, credential types, OIDC token minting, exfiltration, one observed run, affected projects, recommendations
- 3.Megalodon: New CI/CD Malware Spreads Across GitHub, Infecting ~5,000+ RepositoriesOX Security · May 21, 2026 · Researchcount of infected workflow files, payload targets, exfiltration endpoint type, entry by commits and pull requests
- 4.Infostealers Just Spawned a 5,000+ Repo GitHub Supply Chain AttackHudson Rock (InfoStealers) · May 23, 2026 · Researchinfostealer match of pushing usernames, inferred origin of push access
- 5.Malware in @tiledesk/tiledesk-server (GHSA-5vfv-hpg7-77hj)GitHub Advisory Database · May 22, 2026 · Advisoryaffected npm versions, advisory date, remediation advice
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.