What was exposed
Replaying the L2 voter file June 2016 exposure
- 1
Configured: voter file in a database on a Google cloud server
Not stated; open by Apr 11, 2016A year-old copy of L2's national voter file sits in a CouchDB database on a Google cloud server, open to the public with no credential; who set it, when, and which network rule let the internet reach it are not stated.
- 2
Reachable: voter records and the server log read with no credential
Start not stated to June 2016; a visitor logged Apr 11, 2016Anyone who reaches the server's address can read the voter records and the server log with no credential; the log shows an address in Serbia on April 11, 2016, and Threatpost reports that multiple people accessed it before the finder.
- 3
Found and closed: notified June 21, offline within hours
Jun 21 to 22, 2016; the call's date not statedA MacKeeper researcher traces the records to L2 and emails L2 on June 21; L2 identifies its national client, and the database goes offline within three hours of the call that follows.
About 154 million records, per news reports and MacKeeper's roundup, from a year-old copy of L2's national voter file: names, addresses, phone numbers, party, districts, estimated income and ethnicity, and more in some records. They were readable with no credential from a date not stated, with a visitor in the server's log on April 11, 2016, until the database went offline within three hours of the finder's call with L2; Threatpost reports that multiple people accessed it before the finder, and what they read is not stated.
Where cloud-provider controls fit
Had the server run on Compute Engine in a project under your organization, which the sources do not say, a custom Organization Policy constraint that denies firewall rules open to every internet address would have closed one way to open the database's port, though the sources do not say which setting opened it, and the managed constraint that refuses external IPv4 addresses would have left the server with no internet path of its own. A hierarchical firewall policy that denies internet ingress to the database's ports bounds who can read it even where a project rule admits everyone. All three came after the incident. Whether CouchDB asks for a username and password stays with the database software. The find, the notice to L2 and the client's response stay outside the provider's controls.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, no control would have stopped it. 3 controls would have limited how far it went. 2 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 0
- Prevented
- 3
- Contained
- 2
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the L2 voter file June 2016 exposure
1 · Configured: voter file in a database on a Google cloud server
2 Contained3 on other clouds2 · Reachable: voter records and the server log read with no credential
1 Contained1 Not covered3 on other clouds3 · Found and closed: notified June 21, offline within hours
1 Not coveredKey facts
- A CouchDB database on a server whose address resolved to a Google cloud host name answered on its public address with no username, password or other authentication, per the finder; the setting that opened it, who set it and when were not stated
- It held a copy of L2's national voter file from about a year before, about 154 million records per news reports and MacKeeper's roundup, with 17 fields for every record, such as name, address, age, gender, party, phone, districts, estimated income, ethnicity and vote frequency, and more in some records, per the Daily Dot
- Threatpost reported that as many as 15 percent of the records, 22.5 million, carried data beyond what L2 sells
- The server's log showed an address in Serbia working with the same database on April 11, 2016, which the finder said could have been a proxy; Threatpost reported that multiple people had accessed the server before him, and what they read was not stated
- The finder emailed every L2 address he could find on June 21, 2016 with a screenshot; L2 identified its national client, and the database went offline within three hours of the phone call that followed, while Threatpost reported the researcher saying it was removed within three days of the notice
- The client told L2 it had been hacked and its firewall taken down; no source confirmed the claim, and the finder said he viewed it with skepticism
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.Another US Voter Database LeakMacKeeper · Jun 23, 2016 · ResearchCouchDB database on its port with no authentication, address resolving to a Google cloud host name, server space rented from Google's cloud services, record ID scheme matched to L2, log query showing an address in Serbia on April 11, email to L2 on June 21, 2016 with a screenshot, phone call with L2's chief executive, offline within three hours of the call, L2's statement (old copy of the national file, few standard fields, client says it was hacked and its firewall taken down)
- 2.36 Data Breaches We Found and Reported in 2016MacKeeper · Feb 20, 2026 · ResearchJune 2016, 154 million US voters, server rented from Google's cloud services, public access with no authentication, data from L2 sold to a client, offline within three hours of notification, an address in Serbia interacted with the database
- 3.154 million voter records exposed, revealing gun ownership, Facebook profiles, and moreThe Daily Dot · Jun 22, 2016 · News154 million records, CouchDB on Google, misconfiguration, 17 fields for every record and extra fields in some, email addresses and Facebook profile links, the record ID field traced to L2 through a search, email then phone call to L2, secured within three hours of the call, L2's chief executive on the old copy of the national file and the client's hack claim
- 4.Voter Database Leak Exposes 154 Million Sensitive RecordsThreatpost · Jun 24, 2016 · Newsfound on a Tuesday through a search engine of internet-facing services, earlier access by multiple people including an address in Serbia, about 154 million profiles, up to 15 percent supplemented with extra data, L2's client left the data on a Google cloud account, the client says attackers disabled a firewall, removal within three days of notifying L2
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of the exposure; the owner's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the data is exposed. They are not an assessment of the owner's security program.