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DemonstrationGoogle Cloud
6 min read

Tenable's ImageRunner demonstration on Google Cloud Run

Environment
A Google Cloud project Tenable Research staged for the demonstration; no company was named
When
Reported October 19, 2024; test dates not stated – Jan 28, 2025Disclosed Feb 18, 2025
Entry
An identity holding run.services.update and iam.serviceAccounts.actAs on a Cloud Run service and no registry permission; how an attacker would obtain one is not part of the demonstration.

Tenable Research staged ImageRunner in its own Google Cloud project: an identity that could update a Cloud Run service, but held no registry permission, deployed a revision that named a private image of the same project, and Cloud Run's service agent pulled and ran it without checking that the deployer could read it. Container arguments on the revision opened a reverse shell from the image to the researcher's listener, from which Tenable says the image's contents and secrets could be read; no source reports that outside the test. Google now requires the deployer to hold read access to the image, a breaking change fully rolled out on January 28, 2025.

What the demonstration did

Outside parties
Attacker listener
Internet
Cloud Run Admin APIservices.update
Cloud Run
Cloud Run service
+ Artifact Registry repos
+ Container Registry images
+ netcat stand-in image
Private image registries
Revision deployer
Cloud Run service agent
New revision

Replaying Tenable's ImageRunner demonstration / reported October 2024; the test date is not stated

  1. 1

    Deploying a private image without reading it

    Test date not stated · before October 19, 2024

    The deployer updates a running Cloud Run service with a revision that names a private image, and Cloud Run's service agent pulls it without checking the deployer's access.

  2. 2

    A shell inside the private image

    Test date not stated · before October 19, 2024

    The revision's container arguments open a reverse shell from the private image to the listener, through which the image's contents and secrets are open to inspection.

  3. 3

    Report and fix

    October 19, 2024 to January 28, 2025

    Tenable reports the flaw, and Google adds a deploy-time check that the deployer can read the image, fully rolled out on January 28, 2025.

Impact

In Tenable's own project, a new Cloud Run revision ran a private image of the same project and opened a reverse shell to the researcher's listener; reading the image's secrets is stated as possible, not observed, and no source reports exploitation. Google's fix was fully rolled out on January 28, 2025.

Outcome

What ImageRunner shows about your Cloud Run deployers

Two permissions to update a Cloud Run service were enough to run a private image of the same project and open a reverse shell from it, because Cloud Run's service agent pulled the image without checking that the deployer could read it. Google closed that gap for every project: since January 28, 2025, the principal that deploys needs explicit access to the image. On your Google Cloud projects, an IAM deny policy on Cloud Run service updates bounds who can deploy, and Binary Authorization admits only images your pipeline attested; neither is shown to refuse Tenable's identity, and breakglass on a service update bypasses Binary Authorization. A reverse shell is refused only when all of a revision's traffic goes through your VPC network: an organization policy that requires all-traffic VPC egress keeps it there, and a hierarchical firewall policy on that network refuses the listener, although Google's pages do not name Cloud Run traffic for those policies. No control refuses a process reading its own image, so keep secrets out of the images you build.

Would the controls have stopped it?

In hindsight, no control would have stopped it. 4 controls would have limited how far it went. 3 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.

0
Prevented
4
Contained
3
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

Outside parties
Attacker listener
Internet
Cloud Run Admin APIservices.update
Cloud Run
Cloud Run service
+ Artifact Registry repos
+ Container Registry images
+ netcat stand-in image
Private image registries
Revision deployer
Cloud Run service agent
New revision

Replaying Tenable's ImageRunner demonstration / reported October 2024; the test date is not stated

1 · Deploying a private image without reading it

2 Contained1 Not covered

2 · A shell inside the private image

2 Contained1 Not covered6 on other clouds

3 · Report and fix

1 Not covered

Key facts

  • The deployer identity held run.services.update and iam.serviceAccounts.actAs and neither Artifact Registry Reader nor Storage Object Viewer, per Tenable
  • Cloud Run's service agent pulled the private image with its own registry permissions and did not check that the deployer could read it; Tenable's advisory TRA-2025-04 put private images in Artifact Registry and Container Registry of the same project in scope
  • The revision's container arguments ran netcat with /bin/bash and opened a reverse shell to the researcher's listener; Tenable said an attacker could then read the image's contents and secrets, which no source reports as observed
  • Tenable reported the flaw on October 19, 2024; Google said it was working as intended on October 24, 2024, then sent a Mandatory Service Announcement to the owners of affected projects, folders and organizations in the last week of November 2024
  • A Cloud Run release note of January 13, 2025, labeled Breaking, required the principal that creates or updates a resource to hold explicit permission to access the image; the change was 100% rolled out to production on January 28, 2025
  • A Google Cloud spokesperson told SecurityWeek that an image from another project already needed an explicit IAM permission before the fix; Tenable rated the flaw Medium on February 18, 2025, and GovInfoSecurity reported no known exploitation on April 1, 2025

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    ImageRunner: A Privilege Escalation Vulnerability Impacting GCP Cloud RunTenable Research · Apr 1, 2025 · ResearchThe deployer's two permissions, the revision update, the image pull by the service agent, the reverse shell, what the shell could read, the November 2024 announcement and the January 28, 2025 rollout
  2. 2.
    Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Privilege Escalation Vulnerability in GCP Cloud Run (TRA-2025-04)Tenable Research · Feb 18, 2025 · ResearchThe disclosure timeline from October 19, 2024, the registries in scope, the Medium risk rating and the fix
  3. 3.
    Cloud Run release notes (entry of January 13, 2025)Google Cloud · Jan 13, 2025 · Vendor reportThe breaking change that requires the deployer to hold explicit permission to access the image
  4. 4.
    ImageRunner Flaw Exposed Sensitive Information in Google CloudSecurityWeek · Apr 2, 2025 · NewsThe Google Cloud spokesperson's statement on the fix and on the cross-project check that existed before it, and the notification and rollout dates
  5. 5.
    Google Cloud Fix Blocks Unauthorized Container AccessInformation Security Media Group (GovInfoSecurity) · Apr 1, 2025 · NewsNo known exploitation of the flaw

The estate in the replay follows the researchers' description of their own test environment. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the run. They are not an assessment of any company's security program.

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