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IntrusionAWS · SaaS
11 min read

Stolen GitHub token and service keys to SSM commands and database export in AWS

Victim
An unnamed organization, redacted by Wiz
When
Not stated; Wiz published September 29, 2026Disclosed Sep 29, 2026
Entry
A compromised GitHub token cloned 18 private repositories, and the permanent access keys of two CI/CD IAM users named svc_automation were then used from VPN-provider addresses; that the keys came from the cloned repositories is unconfirmed, and how the token and the second key were obtained is not stated.

A compromised GitHub token cloned 18 private repositories, and the permanent access keys of two CI/CD IAM users named svc_automation were then used from VPN-provider addresses in two AWS accounts; Wiz suggests the keys came from the cloned code, which is unconfirmed. The keys assumed an admin role and a CI role and sent SSM commands, one of them to a production domain controller at 10:06 UTC, and three export scripts for SQL Server, PostgreSQL and billing data were staged in S3 and run on EC2 instances. Wiz's September 29, 2026 write-up gives no incident date, no containment and no confirmation that data left the environment.

What happened

External Parties
Unidentified actor
Wiz
Internet
AWS APIs and AWS STSpermanent IAM user keys
First AWS account
Export hosts and databases
+ 18 private repositories
+ compromised token
+ AWS key source (unconfirmed)
GitHub
Private GitHub repositories
+ svc_automation, second key
+ CI role
+ domain controller instance
Second AWS account
svc_automation
Admin role
SSM targets (not named)
Staging S3 bucket
EC2 export hosts
SQL Server, PostgreSQL, billing

Replaying the GitHub and AWS intrusion of 2026

  1. 1

    Private code taken from GitHub

    Date not stated, hours before the AWS activity

    A compromised GitHub token clones 18 private repositories from the actor's address range; Wiz suggests the AWS key came from that code, which is unconfirmed.

  2. 2

    CI key used from a VPN in the first account

    Date and time not stated

    In a first cloud unit — an AWS account — svc_automation's permanent key is accepted from a VPN exit node, assumes a role the post calls admin and calls SSM SendCommand.

  3. 3

    A second key reaches a domain controller

    09:52 to 10:06 UTC, date not stated

    A different svc_automation key in a second AWS account assumes the CI role twice and sends SSM SendCommand to a production domain controller.

  4. 4

    Export scripts staged and run

    Date not stated

    Three export scripts land in an S3 bucket, and EC2 instances fetch and run them against SQL Server, PostgreSQL and billing data; whether data left is not confirmed.

Impact

Per Wiz's write-up of September 29, 2026, a compromised GitHub token cloned 18 private repositories. The permanent keys of two CI/CD IAM users named svc_automation were then accepted from VPN-provider addresses in two AWS accounts: in the first, the actor assumed a role the post calls admin and called SSM SendCommand, with no target or result stated; in the second, the CI role was assumed at 09:52 and 09:55 UTC and SSM SendCommand reached a production domain controller at 10:06 UTC, which Wiz reads as remote code execution. Three Python export scripts for SQL Server, PostgreSQL and billing data were written to an S3 bucket whose account is not stated, and EC2 instances fetched them with curl and ran them through SSM commands. Whether any data left the environment is not confirmed.

Outcome

Where cloud-provider controls fit

Six rows for the reported GitHub and AWS steps would have stopped a step outright, each under a condition of your own estate. A GitHub IP allow list refuses the clone from the actor's address range if your organization uses GitHub Enterprise Cloud. In a member account of your organization, a service control policy that denies the CI/CD users off your expected networks refuses the calls made with the stolen keys from a VPN exit node, including the AssumeRole calls in both accounts. A resource control policy refuses AssumeRole on the admin role from there, and a service control policy that denies SendCommand to all but approved automation roles refuses the command in the first account if the caller is not one of them. The other rows cap a step. A principal that may edit a role's trust policy can undo a deny written there, and one that may change an instance's tags can take a domain controller out of a tag-based deny. The post does not say which credential signed SendCommand in either account, so a role-only network deny remains a cap; it also leaves the S3 writer and bucket ownership unstated. Security groups limit new host-initiated connections; allowed inbound responses and existing tracked flows can still carry exported data. Refusing new access keys limits creation by non-exempt principals; existing keys need separate revocation and the pipeline needs a separate move to roles. The key in the code stays with GitHub: push protection acts there, and no cloud control reaches the clone or the code.

Could this have been prevented?

In hindsight, not as a whole. 6 controls would have refused a step outright, and 16 controls would have limited one. 2 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.

6
Prevented
16
Contained
2
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

External Parties
Unidentified actor
Wiz
Internet
AWS APIs and AWS STSpermanent IAM user keys
First AWS account
Export hosts and databases
+ 18 private repositories
+ compromised token
+ AWS key source (unconfirmed)
GitHub
Private GitHub repositories
+ svc_automation, second key
+ CI role
+ domain controller instance
Second AWS account
svc_automation
Admin role
SSM targets (not named)
Staging S3 bucket
EC2 export hosts
SQL Server, PostgreSQL, billing

Replaying the GitHub and AWS intrusion of 2026

1 · Private code taken from GitHub

1 Prevented2 Contained2 Not covered

2 · CI key used from a VPN in the first account

4 Prevented4 Contained6 on other clouds

3 · A second key reaches a domain controller

1 Prevented3 Contained3 on other clouds

4 · Export scripts staged and run

7 Contained9 on other clouds

Key facts

  • A compromised GitHub token cloned 18 private repositories from the actor's address range a few hours before the AWS activity, per the GitHub audit logs Wiz cites; the token type and how it was compromised were not stated
  • In the first AWS account, the permanent access key of svc_automation, a CI/CD IAM user created in 2018, was used with the AWS CLI on Kali Linux from a VPN-provider address, against a 30-day baseline of three Amazon-owned addresses; three detection rules fired, and the actor called AssumeRole (admin) and SSM SendCommand
  • In a second AWS account, an IAM user also named svc_automation, with a different permanent key, assumed the CI role at 09:52 and 09:55 UTC and sent SSM SendCommand to a production domain controller at 10:06 UTC; the date of these times was not stated
  • Three Python scripts built to export SQL Server, PostgreSQL and billing data were written to an S3 bucket from the actor's addresses, and EC2 instances fetched them with curl and ran them through SSM commands; the bucket's account was not stated
  • Wiz published the investigation on September 29, 2026 with the victim redacted; it described no containment, key revocation or remediation and did not confirm that data left the environment

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    The Blue Agent POV: Investigating Multi-Platform Data Exfiltration Across AWS and GitHubWiz · Sep 29, 2026 · ResearchAWS actor baseline and deviation, cross-account AssumeRole, SSM SendCommand to a domain controller, S3 tool staging, EC2 script execution, GitHub repository cloning, attack-chain reading

The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.

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