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DemonstrationGoogle Cloud
2 min read

Google Cloud tightened checks on default service accounts

Environment
Google Cloud service-account research
When
The researchers filed their initial report on June 3, 2019.Disclosed Nov 22, 2020
Entry
Some services historically let a deployer use the default service account without a separate check for permission to use it.

Dylan Ayrey and Allison Donovan reported that several Google Cloud services did not separately check whether a deployer could use the default service account. Their account of Google’s response helps explain two controls that matter today: authorizing attachment and reviewing the roles a worker already holds.

What the demonstration did

Researcher
Dylan Ayrey and Allison Donovan
Internet
Google Cloud
Worker identity

Research environment / Google Cloud service-account research

  1. 1

    Legacy deployment did not separately authorize the worker identity

    Reported in June 2019

    The researchers identified Dataflow among services with legacy behavior that allowed deployments to use a default identity without a separate permission check.

  2. 2

    A default account could already hold project Editor

    2019–2020 findings

    The researchers described default service accounts holding the broad project Editor role. The scope of a workload’s actions depended on the rights attached to its service account.

Impact

The researchers found a gap between permission to deploy a workload and permission to use its service account. A default account with project Editor could give that workload more access than the deployer.

Would the controls have stopped it?

Authorize worker identities and review existing grants

For legacy Dataflow projects, require the deployer to be authorized to use the default worker identity. Separately review the identity’s current grants. Disabling automatic Editor grants protects new accounts and leaves existing bindings intact.

Incident control assessments

1
Prevented
0
Contained
1
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

Researcher
Dylan Ayrey and Allison Donovan
Internet
Google Cloud
Worker identity

Research environment / Google Cloud service-account research

1 · Legacy deployment did not separately authorize the worker identity

1 Prevented

2 · A default account could already hold project Editor

1 Not covered

Key facts

  • The initial report was filed June 3, 2019, and triaged on June 14.
  • Dataflow was among the services the researchers identified as affected.
  • Google initially committed to documentation changes in July 2019.
  • The researchers published their account on November 22, 2020, and described changes to the affected services.

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    Fixing a Google VulnerabilityDylan Ayrey and Allison Donovan · Nov 22, 2020 · ResearchThe researchers documented legacy attachment behavior, broad default roles, and their work with Google to change the affected services.
  2. 2.
    Requiring permission to attach service accounts to resourcesGoogle Cloud · undated · AdvisoryThe Dataflow-specific constraint enforces the default-account attachment check in organizations with legacy behavior.
  3. 3.
    Types of service accountsGoogle Cloud · undated · AdvisoryGoogle documents automatic Editor grants, the May 2024 default and separate remediation of existing grants.

The estate in the replay follows the researchers' description of their own test environment. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the run. They are not an assessment of any company's security program.

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