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DemonstrationGoogle Cloud
1 min read

Google closed a non-production App Engine service boundary

Environment
Google’s non-production App Engine environment
When
The first report was filed February 25, 2018. – May 16, 2018Disclosed May 20, 2018
Entry
A test application in a non-production App Engine environment reached a provider-internal service.

Ezequiel Pereira reported a boundary failure in Google’s non-production App Engine environment. A further report identified an internal configuration service within reach of his test application. Google restricted access and subsequently confirmed a fix.

What the demonstration did

Researcher
Ezequiel Pereira
Internet
Google App Engine
Staging service

Research environment / Google’s non-production App Engine environment

  1. 1

    A staging application crossed an internal boundary

    February 25, 2018

    An application Pereira deployed to a non-production environment could reach a Google-internal service. He reported that boundary failure to Google.

  2. 2

    Google restricted staging access and confirmed a fix

    March–May 2018

    Pereira reported access to an internal application-configuration service. Google restricted access to the non-production environment and confirmed a fix on May 16.

Impact

A researcher demonstrated access to a Google-internal configuration service from a non-production application. Google treated the finding as remote code execution under its rewards program. The report does not establish access to customer projects or a production workload.

Would the controls have stopped it?

Keep provider and tenant responsibilities distinct

Google restricted the non-production environment and confirmed the fix. The report does not identify a tenant configuration that could have enforced the missing internal boundary.

Incident control assessments

0
Prevented
0
Contained
2
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

Researcher
Ezequiel Pereira
Internet
Google App Engine
Staging service

Research environment / Google’s non-production App Engine environment

1 · A staging application crossed an internal boundary

1 Not covered

2 · Google restricted staging access and confirmed a fix

1 Not covered

Key facts

  • Pereira reported the initial issue on February 25, 2018.
  • He reported the additional internal service finding on March 4 and 5, 2018.
  • Pereira said non-production access was blocked between March 6 and March 13, 2018.
  • Google awarded $36,337 on March 13, 2018, and confirmed the fix on May 16.

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    $36k Google App Engine RCEEzequiel Pereira · undated · ResearchFirst-hand observations of a non-production service boundary, reports to Google, reward and fix confirmation.
  2. 2.
    App Engine standard environmentGoogle Cloud · undated · AdvisoryDescribes a managed application runtime. It does not establish which internal control Google changed.
  3. 3.
    Ezequiel Pereira — PublicationsEzequiel Pereira · undated · ResearchThe researcher lists his App Engine write-up as published May 20, 2018.
  4. 4.
    Public submission of Pereira’s App Engine reportHacker News · May 21, 2018 · ResearchA publicly timestamped link to the original report independently establishes availability by May 21, 2018.

The estate in the replay follows the researchers' description of their own test environment. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the run. They are not an assessment of any company's security program.

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