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IntrusionMicrosoft Entra · SaaS · Azure
13 min read

ConnectWise Cloud Backup OAuth application compromise

Victim
ConnectWise (Cloud Backup, formerly SkyKick) and the Microsoft 365 tenants where its applications were consented
When
Oct 10, 2026 – Nov 11, 2026Disclosed Oct 16, 2026
Entry
A vendor's multitenant OAuth application credential, kept in the vendor's own tenant, was presented from a hosting-provider address for app-only Microsoft Graph tokens in the customer tenants where the application was consented; how the credential was obtained is unconfirmed.

In October 2026 an attacker held the credentials of several ConnectWise Cloud Backup and Cloud Management applications, multitenant apps that partners had consented in their Microsoft 365 tenants. From a hosting-provider address the Cloud Backup credential was accepted for app-only Microsoft Graph tokens, with over 300 sign-ins succeeding among almost 1,000 tenants, per Huntress's update of October 17, 2026, and in two tenants, per Huntress, the Cloud Management MS Teams app made itself Global Administrator and planted client secrets on two applications registered inside the tenant. How the credentials were obtained is unconfirmed, no source confirms or rules out that mail, files or chats were read, and ConnectWise marked the incident resolved on November 11, 2026, with the root cause still under investigation.

What happened

External Parties
Spray address
VPN addresses
Hosting address
+ 5 more
Internet
Microsoft Entra IDtoken endpoint
ConnectWise Tenant
Customer Tenants
+ policy, trade
+ national security
+ critical minerals
Targeted Tenants
+ Resource Manager
+ Key Vaults
+ role assignments
Azure Subscriptions
Cloud Backup App
App Credentials
Cloud Management Apps
Cloud Backup App
Cloud Mgmt · MS Teams
Directory Roles
MSP and Huntress Apps
Mail, Files, Chats

Replaying the ConnectWise OAuth October 2026 intrusion

  1. 1

    Password sprays from the hosting range

    October 10 to 14, 2026

    Two addresses in one hosting range spray passwords at Microsoft 365 user accounts; no user sign-in succeeds.

  2. 2

    Vendor identities turned against tenants

    Up to October 15, 2026, 03:57 UTC

    The attacker holds the credentials of ConnectWise applications; in two tenants, per Huntress, the MS Teams app makes itself Global Administrator and plants client secrets on two applications registered inside the tenant.

  3. 3

    App-only Graph tokens

    October 15, 2026, 06:13–08:46 UTC

    The Cloud Backup credential is presented from 144.172.64[.]128 to almost 1,000 tenants in a loop that appears to stop partway, per Huntress; over 300 sign-ins succeed, and a tenant that accepts it issues an app-only Microsoft Graph token with every mailbox, file and chat in reach.

  4. 4

    Targeted sweeps

    October 15, 2026, 09:25–14:20 UTC

    A first sweep requests Graph tokens in 16 tenants in sensitive sectors, per the Huntress report, and a second requests tokens for six resources per tenant, Azure Resource Manager among them; the Huntress follow-up calls the first hand-ordered and the second scripted, where its first post said the second appeared manual, and Huntress calls the wave unsuccessful.

Impact

Over 300 sign-ins of the Cloud Backup application succeeded among almost 1,000 Microsoft Entra tenants, per Huntress's update of October 17, 2026; its earlier count was 162 tenants as of October 16. Where a token was issued, every mailbox, file and Teams chat the consent covered was in reach, and no source confirms or rules out a read. Microsoft counted more than 2,250 tenants attempted, most unsuccessfully, and the text of one of its detections reports Key Vault secret reads in downstream customer environments. In two tenants, per Huntress, a vendor application made itself Global Administrator and planted client secrets on two applications registered inside the tenant. Both password sprays, a targeted wave against 16 tenants and ConnectWise's backup archives held.

Outcome

Where cloud-provider controls fit

The credential lived in ConnectWise's own tenant, and Microsoft Entra applies no Conditional Access policy to a multitenant vendor app's app-only sign-in, so your tenant issues the token to whoever holds that credential for as long as the app stays consented and enabled. No Microsoft Entra or Azure control here would have stopped the incident; some would have limited it: an application management policy that refuses new client secrets until an administrator lifts it, SharePoint Application Restrictions and Exchange Online RBAC for Applications on what the app may read, and the app disabled in every tenant that no longer uses the service. On AWS and Google Cloud you can also bound a vendor's credential to the vendor's published networks. ConnectWise marked the incident resolved on November 11, 2026, with the root cause still under investigation, and no source had confirmed or ruled out that mail, files or chats were read.

Could this have been prevented?

In hindsight, no control would have stopped it. 9 controls would have limited how far it went. 7 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.

0
Prevented
9
Contained
7
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

External Parties
Spray address
VPN addresses
Hosting address
+ 5 more
Internet
Microsoft Entra IDtoken endpoint
ConnectWise Tenant
Customer Tenants
+ policy, trade
+ national security
+ critical minerals
Targeted Tenants
+ Resource Manager
+ Key Vaults
+ role assignments
Azure Subscriptions
Cloud Backup App
App Credentials
Cloud Management Apps
Cloud Backup App
Cloud Mgmt · MS Teams
Directory Roles
MSP and Huntress Apps
Mail, Files, Chats

Replaying the ConnectWise OAuth October 2026 intrusion

1 · Password sprays from the hosting range

2 Contained6 on other clouds

2 · Vendor identities turned against tenants

1 Contained3 Not covered7 on other clouds

3 · App-only Graph tokens

3 Contained2 Not covered3 on other clouds

4 · Targeted sweeps

3 Contained2 Not covered

Key facts

  • From October 10 to 14, 2026, a password spray from 144.172.64[.]99 produced more than 151,000 failed sign-ins against 327 accounts in eight organizations, and no sign-in succeeded, per Microsoft
  • On October 15, 2026, at 03:44 UTC the Cloud Management MS Teams application added itself to Global Administrator in one tenant and the same sequence ran in a second; a script planted client secrets valid to 2028 on two applications registered inside the tenant, an MSP management application and a single-tenant Huntress application, per Huntress
  • From 06:13 UTC on October 15, 2026, the Cloud Backup credential was presented from 144.172.64[.]128 to the token endpoint of almost 1,000 tenants; Todyl's records show one app-only Microsoft Graph token per tenant, no user, no MFA and Conditional Access status notApplied
  • Over 300 of those sign-ins succeeded, per Huntress's update of October 17, 2026; its earlier count was 162 tenants with confirmed unauthorized sign-ins as of 19:00 UTC on October 16
  • Microsoft counted sign-in attempts against more than 2,250 tenants, most of them unsuccessful, in its post of October 21, 2026, which assesses that Storm-0940 was responsible; the text of one of its detections reports secret reads across multiple Azure Key Vaults in downstream customer environments and names no application, count or date
  • ConnectWise disabled seven application identities on October 17, 2026, completed a reset of every account and credential on October 19, began a phased restoration through a new application on October 28 and marked its status-page incident resolved on November 11, with the root cause still under investigation

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    Trust Center advisories: Cloud Backup (formerly known as SkyKick) Service Interruption, updates and FAQsConnectWise · Nov 4, 2026 · Vendor reportVendor timeline, containment actions, indicators, application IDs, backup-data statements, downstream-visibility limits, attribution wording, restoration phases, partner actions
  2. 2.
    ConnectWise Cloud Backup Issue Investigation (status page incident)ConnectWise · Nov 11, 2026 · Status pageStatus timestamps, services suspended, identities disabled, credential reset date, restoration start
  3. 3.
    Cloud Backup technical investigation and remediation guideConnectWise · Oct 18, 2026 · Vendor reportApplication IDs, containment time, indicators, token validity, review workflow, Entra control limits, log retention
  4. 4.
    AI-driven, large-scale nation-state campaign using ARTEX enables supply chain compromiseMicrosoft Security Blog, Microsoft Threat Intelligence · Oct 21, 2026 · AdvisoryAttribution, actor history, tenants attempted, password spray figures, follow-on directory operations, Key Vault activity, indicators, mitigations
  5. 5.
    ConnectWise (SkyKick) Vendor Credentials Abused in M365 AttacksHuntress · Oct 27, 2026 · ResearchPer-tenant attack chain, sign-in windows, tenant counts, password spray, second wave, indicators, Huntress's own application, recommended actions
  6. 6.
    AI, Scripts, Operator - Inside the ConnectWise AttackHuntress · Oct 26, 2026 · ResearchFine-grained timeline of October 15, 2026, credential-change sequence, token-request patterns, logging gaps, assessment of automation
  7. 7.
    Investigation: Unauthorized Access Through the ConnectWise Cloud Backup Microsoft 365 AppTodyl · Oct 27, 2026 · ResearchSign-in window, token attributes, app permissions in reach, absence of persistence in its tenants, token validity, log retention, recommended actions
  8. 8.
    Hackers breach Microsoft 365 tenants via ConnectWise supply-chain attackBleepingComputer · Oct 18, 2026 · NewsMicrosoft statement as reported, ConnectWise statements, shut-off time, Todyl findings as reported, user agents
  9. 9.
    ConnectWise suspends Cloud Backup service after attackers abuse its Microsoft 365 accessHelp Net Security · Oct 19, 2026 · NewsDiscovery date as reported, ConnectWise statements, Huntress findings as reported, product vulnerability wording
  10. 10.
    ConnectWise suspends Cloud Backup service as hacker targets Microsoft 365 usersChannel Dive (first published on Cybersecurity Dive) · Oct 19, 2026 · NewsMicrosoft X post wording, ConnectWise spokesperson statement, Huntress figures, detection weekday
  11. 11.
    ConnectWise breach: Cloud services disruption continues three days after initial intrusion detectedITPro (ChannelPro) · Oct 20, 2026 · NewsDetection date as reported, suspension sequence, Huntress and Todyl statements as reported

The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.

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