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IntrusionGoogle Cloud · Microsoft Entra
3 min read

Russian espionage group COLD RELIC steals Google Drive files

Victim
Two unnamed US organizations
When
Late 2025 at the first organization, 2026 at the secondDisclosed Nov 17, 2026
Entry
At the first organization, a Google Workspace administrator approved the attackers’ sign-in request. At the second, the group signed in to Workspace through Microsoft Entra ID using a compromised user account.

COLD RELIC is Google’s name for a Russian state-sponsored espionage group it previously tracked as COLDRIVER. Mandiant found that the group downloaded Google Drive files from two unnamed U.S. organizations. It used information stolen from the first to target employees at the second.

What happened

Attributed group
COLD RELIC
Internet
First organization
Second organization
Workspace administrator
Federated user

Two organizations sustain different losses

  1. 1

    First organization · administrator sign-in

    Late 2025

    The first organization’s Google Workspace Super Admin account authenticated after the administrator approved a push notification.

  2. 2

    First organization · connected mail clients

    During the first intrusion

    Mandiant recorded mailbox synchronization to external email clients during months of access at the first organization.

  3. 3

    Second organization · authenticator enrollment

    2026

    In the second organization, Mandiant observed a new MFA device registered and used on the compromised Entra user account that provided sign-in to Google Workspace.

  4. 4

    Both organizations · files already downloaded

    Across the two investigations

    The first organization lost the contents of its cloud drive. The second lost files accessible to one user. Mandiant linked information taken in the first intrusion to the targeting of the second organization.

Impact

At the first organization, COLD RELIC downloaded the contents of the organization’s cloud drive. At the second, it downloaded files available to one compromised user. Mandiant linked the intrusions through information taken from the first organization. Neither victim was named.

Could this have been prevented?

Protect both sign-in and the ability to register another authenticator

Google’s “Only security key” policy accepts a security key or passkey. It could have refused the push approval used at the first organization. At the second, Microsoft Entra Conditional Access could have restricted registration of another authenticator. Compare new sign-in methods and mail app connections with changes in Drive downloads or external sharing. During recovery, revoke affected sessions, remove unrecognized authenticators and review connected apps in Workspace and at the identity provider. Files already downloaded remain outside those controls.

Incident control assessments

1
Prevented
2
Contained
1
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

Attributed group
COLD RELIC
Internet
First organization
Second organization
Workspace administrator
Federated user

Two organizations sustain different losses

1 · First organization · administrator sign-in

1 Prevented

2 · First organization · connected mail clients

1 Contained

3 · Second organization · authenticator enrollment

1 Contained

4 · Both organizations · files already downloaded

1 Not covered

Key facts

  • The first organization’s Google Workspace Super Admin account accepted an MFA push in late 2025.
  • Mandiant observed downloads of the first organization’s entire cloud drive. It separately recorded initiation of an administrative data export.
  • The second organization used Microsoft Entra ID as its identity provider for Google Workspace.
  • COLD RELIC added an authentication method to the second organization’s user account and downloaded files that user could access in 2026.
  • At the first organization, Mandiant saw attacker-enrolled passkeys remain usable after resets.

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    COLD RELIC: A Case Study in Impersonation and CompromiseGoogle Threat Intelligence Group and Mandiant · Nov 17, 2026 · ResearchMandiant’s incident-response findings at both organizations, Google’s attribution, observed data access and recovery guidance.
  2. 2.
    Deploy 2-Step VerificationGoogle Workspace · undated · Vendor reportEnforcement of the security-key-only option for Google account sign-ins, including enrollment and exceptions.
  3. 3.
    Control which apps access Google Workspace dataGoogle Workspace · undated · Vendor reportApp access settings for Google Workspace APIs and restrictions on third-party clients’ access to Gmail.
  4. 4.
    How authentication strengths work in a Conditional Access policyMicrosoft · undated · Vendor reportAuthentication strengths for the Register security information user action, existing methods, and controlled enrollment and recovery.
  5. 5.
    Manage a user’s security settingsGoogle Workspace · undated · Vendor reportSession resets, third-party application access and the separate session at an external identity provider.

The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.

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