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IntrusionMicrosoft Entra ยท Azure
8 min read

Leaked service principal secret to Global Administrator and Azure Owner in one morning

Victim
An unnamed Microsoft Entra ID and Azure tenant observed by the Sysdig Threat Research Team
When
not stated; one morning before July 14, 2026Disclosed Jul 14, 2026
Entry
A leaked client secret of a service principal that held an admin-consented Microsoft Graph permission to manage directory roles.

The Sysdig Threat Research Team reported on July 14, 2026 that a service principal's client secret, exposed for about two weeks, was used to sign in to an unnamed tenant at 03:27 UTC, and that the application's admin-consented Microsoft Graph permission let it make itself Global Administrator, outside Privileged Identity Management, under three minutes later. It planted client secrets on 26 application registrations, then at 04:32 UTC used elevate access to take User Access Administrator at the Azure root, gave itself an Owner-class role on the subscription, listed the keys of four storage accounts and two Event Hub namespaces and read secrets from three Key Vaults. What was read, whether the keys were used and the day of the intrusion are not stated.

What happened

External Parties
Anonymizing networks
Internet
Microsoft Entra IDclient secret sign-in
Azure Subscription
Microsoft Entra Tenant
Event Hub namespaces
Storage accounts
Key Vaults
Service principal
Directory roles
26 app registrations

Replaying the Azure service principal takeover / one morning, day not stated

  1. 1

    A leaked app secret signs in

    03:27 UTC, day not stated

    A client secret exposed for about two weeks signs in as the service principal from a hosting provider in the Netherlands.

  2. 2

    Global Administrator in under three minutes

    03:28 to 03:50 UTC, day not stated

    The application's consented Graph permission makes it Global Administrator, and 26 application registrations get attacker-controlled secrets.

  3. 3

    From the directory to the subscription

    04:32 to 04:34 UTC, day not stated

    Elevate access opens the Azure root and an Owner-class role follows. Storage and Event Hub keys are listed, and Key Vault secrets are read.

Impact

In one morning the attacker took Global Administrator of the directory, User Access Administrator at the Azure root and an Owner-class role on the subscription, planted secrets on 26 application registrations, listed the keys of four storage accounts and two Event Hub namespaces and read secrets from three Key Vaults. What was read and whether data left the tenant are not stated.

Outcome

Where Microsoft Entra and Azure controls fit

No Microsoft Entra setting refuses a directory role assignment made by an application you consented to manage roles, and no Azure setting refuses elevate access to a Global Administrator. The grants you consent to decide those two steps. A Conditional Access policy for workload identities would have refused the first sign-in from the hosting provider, if the application is single-tenant and its workload signs in only from known addresses. An application management policy that blocks new client secrets does not refuse a secret that already exists, and the write-up does not say when the leaked secret was made. After the takeover the two policies would only have narrowed the planted secrets, because a Global Administrator can change both. In Azure, an Azure Policy deny on Owner-class role assignments, storage accounts with shared key access off, Event Hubs namespaces with local authentication disabled and Key Vault network rules would have capped what the identity reached, until an Owner changed them.

Could this have been prevented?

In hindsight, not as a whole. 1 control would have refused a step outright, and 7 controls would have limited one. 2 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.

1
Prevented
7
Contained
2
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

External Parties
Anonymizing networks
Internet
Microsoft Entra IDclient secret sign-in
Azure Subscription
Microsoft Entra Tenant
Event Hub namespaces
Storage accounts
Key Vaults
Service principal
Directory roles
26 app registrations

Replaying the Azure service principal takeover / one morning, day not stated

1 ยท A leaked app secret signs in

1 Prevented1 Contained3 on other clouds

2 ยท Global Administrator in under three minutes

2 Contained1 Not covered6 on other clouds

3 ยท From the directory to the subscription

4 Contained1 Not covered3 on other clouds

Key facts

  • Sysdig published the analysis on July 14, 2026, with UTC times within one morning but no calendar date and no victim name
  • The service principal's client secret had been exposed for about two weeks and replayed from VPN ranges, Tor exit nodes and small hosting providers before the first valid sign-in, from a hosting provider in the Netherlands at 03:27 UTC. Where it leaked was not stated
  • The application held the admin-consented Microsoft Graph permission RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory, while its roles view showed only Cloud Application Administrator. At 03:29:57 UTC a permanent assignment made outside Privileged Identity Management gave it Global Administrator
  • Between 03:29 and 03:50 UTC attacker-controlled client secrets were added to 26 application registrations, and one of them was later reused from a different egress point
  • At 04:32:37 UTC the elevate access action gave User Access Administrator at the Azure root scope, and seven seconds later a role assignment gave an Owner-class role on the subscription
  • The access keys of four storage accounts and the root keys of the two Event Hub namespaces that carried the audit telemetry were listed, and three Key Vault access policies were changed before secrets were read. Use of the keys, what was read and any exfiltration were not stated

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    No single pane of glass: Anatomy of an Azure permission takeoverSysdig Threat Research Team ยท Jul 14, 2026 ยท ResearchEntry credential, exposure window, directory escalation, persistence on app registrations, elevation to root, subscription role, key harvest, Key Vault access, persistence check

The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.

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