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IntrusionGoogle Cloud
2 min read

Stolen App Engine credentials used to create more than 1,600 VMs

Victim
An unnamed Google Cloud customer
When
Observed June 16, 2022Disclosed Dec 8, 2022
Entry
Credentials for the default App Engine service account were stolen. Unit 42 did not establish how. The account had the project Editor role.

The default App Engine service account had the project Editor role. Unit 42 saw rapid VM creation across regions and later observed new service account keys being issued.

What happened

Internet
App Engine identityProject Editor
Google Cloud project
VPC firewall
Compute Engine
Service account keys

Google Cloud project, June 2022

  1. 1

    Stolen credentials

    Time unknown

    Credentials for the default App Engine service account were stolen. Unit 42 did not establish how. The account had the project Editor role.

  2. 2

    Firewall change

    June 16, 2022

    The service account attempted to add the Compute Admin role and added a permissive firewall rule. The outcome of the role request was not reported.

  3. 3

    Compute allocation

    June 16, 2022

    The actor created more than 1,600 VMs across regions. Unit 42 illustrated one VM configuration with four GPUs.

  4. 4

    Additional keys

    June 16, 2022

    The actor created multiple new service account keys. Unit 42 did not report whether those keys were later used.

Impact

More than 1,600 virtual machines were created across multiple regions for cryptomining. Unit 42 documented a GPU-equipped configuration and multiple new service account keys. It did not report the customer’s bill.

Could this have been prevented?

Limit how many GPUs the project can use

Set a project-wide GPU limit that covers your legitimate demand, and keep the application account from raising it. This bounds GPU allocation across regions. CPU-only VMs and charges within the limit remain possible. If workloads can run without new user-managed keys, an organization policy can also block the creation of additional keys. Existing keys remain usable.

Incident control assessments

2
Prevented
1
Contained
1
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

Internet
App Engine identityProject Editor
Google Cloud project
VPC firewall
Compute Engine
Service account keys

Google Cloud project, June 2022

1 · Stolen credentials

1 Not covered

2 · Firewall change

1 Prevented

3 · Compute allocation

1 Contained

4 · Additional keys

1 Prevented

Key facts

  • Unit 42 recorded the project activity on June 16, 2022.
  • The actor attempted to add the Compute Admin role. The outcome was not reported.
  • Unit 42 illustrated a four-GPU configuration. It did not say how many of the more than 1,600 VMs used it.
  • The last key-creation event shown in the report occurred over an hour after the first recorded activity.

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials: Case Studies From the WildPalo Alto Networks Unit 42 · Dec 8, 2022 · ResearchGoogle Cloud case timeline, project role, firewall change, VM count and additional keys

The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.

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